In June 1996, Berkshire’s Chairman, Warren E. Buffett, issued a booklet entitled “An Owner’s Manual*” to Berkshire’s Class A and Class B shareholders. The purpose of the manual was to explain Berkshire’s broad economic principles of operation. An updated version is reproduced on this and the following pages.
在 1996 年時，波克夏的董事長華倫‧巴菲特發行一本名為「股東手冊」的小冊子給波克夏 A 股及 B 股的股票持有人。其目的在闡釋波克夏營運所遵循的各種經濟守則。以下所示為更新後版本。
OWNER-RELATED BUSINESS PRINCIPLES
與股東密切相關的事業守則
At the time of the Blue Chip merger in 1983, I set down 13 owner-related business principles that I thought would help new shareholders understand our managerial approach. As is appropriate for “principles,” all 13 remain alive and well today, and they are stated here in italics.
在 1983 年合併藍籌公司的時候，我立下了 13 項與股東密切相關的事業守則，希望這將協助新的股票持有人瞭解我們的管理方式。正如「守則」的意涵，13 項守則完整保留至今，在此將以斜體字條列。
1. Although our form is corporate, our attitude is partnership. Charlie Munger and I think of our shareholders as owner-partners, and of ourselves as managing partners. (Because of the size of our shareholdings we are also, for better or worse, controlling partners.) We do not view the company itself as the ultimate owner of our business assets but instead view the company as a conduit through which our shareholders own the assets.
雖然我們的形態是企業但我們的態度卻是合夥事業。查理‧孟格和我都將我們的股東視為經營合夥人，而我們自己則為經營伙伴 (由於持有的股權規模之故，姑且不論好壞，我們也是控制伙伴)。我們並未將公司視為所擁有事業資產的最終持有人，反而是將其視為我們股東擁有資產的一個管道。
Charlie and I hope that you do not think of yourself as merely owning a piece of paper whose price wiggles around daily and that is a candidate for sale when some economic or political event makes you nervous. We hope you instead visualize yourself as a part owner of a business that you expect to stay with indefinitely, much as you might if you owned a farm or apartment house in partnership with members of your family. For our part, we do not view Berkshire shareholders as faceless members of an ever-shifting crowd, but rather as co-venturers who have entrusted their funds to us for what may well turn out to be the remainder of their lives.
查理跟我希望你們不要認為自己只是擁有一張價格會每天波動的紙張，而這張紙只是當某些使你緊張萬分的經濟或政治事件出現，你選擇拋售與否的選項之一。我們反倒希望你將自己視為是某個事業的部分所有人，而這事業是你願意永久保留的，如同你可能跟其他家庭成員共同擁有一座農場或是一間公寓一般。對我們而言，我們不會將波克夏的股東視為一群常變動的無名氏，而是願意將他們原本可以用以安度餘生的資金託付給我們一同參與冒險的伙伴。
The evidence suggests that most Berkshire shareholders have indeed embraced this long-term partnership concept. The annual percentage turnover in Berkshire’s shares is a small fraction of that occurring in the stocks of other major American corporations, even when the shares I own are excluded from the calculation.
In effect, our shareholders behave in respect to their Berkshire stock much as Berkshire itself behaves in respect to companies in which it has an investment. As owners of, say, Coca-Cola or American Express shares, we think of Berkshire as being a non-managing partner in two extraordinary businesses, in which we measure our success by the long-term progress of the companies rather than by the month-to-month movements of their stocks. In fact, we would not care in the least if several years went by in which there was no trading, or quotation of prices, in the stocks of those companies. If we have good long-term expectations, short-term price changes are meaningless for us except to the extent they offer us an opportunity to increase our ownership at an attractive price.
證據顯示大部分的波克夏股東的確欣然接受這長期伙伴的概念。波克夏股票每年的周轉率相對其他大多數美國企業來說只是很小的比率，即便是把我所持有的股份排除在外來計算亦是如此。
實際上，我們的股東對波克夏股票的影響與波克夏對其投資的影響如出一轍。就好比波克夏亦是可口可樂或美國運通的股票持有人，我們視波克夏為這兩家卓越公司的不具管理權限的伙伴，而我們以公司長期發展的成果來衡量我們的績效而非每月股價的波動程度。事實上，就算這些公司在市場上長達數年都沒有交易或是報價，我們也完全不在意。如果我們抱持長期的展望，短期股價的變化對我們來說是無任何意義的，除非是他們出現提供我們增加其持股機會的誘人價格。
2. In line with Berkshire’s owner-orientation, most of our directors have a major portion of their net worth invested in the company. We eat our own cooking.
為了與波克夏股東導向一致，我們大部份的董事都將其大部分淨資產淨值投資在公司上，我們可是自食其力。
Charlie’s family has 90% or more of its net worth in Berkshire shares; I have about 99%. In addition, many of my relatives—my sisters and cousins, for example—keep a huge portion of their net worth in Berkshire stock.
Charlie and I feel totally comfortable with this eggs-in-one-basket situation because Berkshire itself owns a wide variety of truly extraordinary businesses. Indeed, we believe that Berkshire is close to being unique in the quality and diversity of the businesses in which it owns either a controlling interest or a minority interest of significance.
查理的家族有九成甚至更多的資產淨值形式是波克夏的持股；我個人則是 99%。除此之外，我很多親屬例如我的姊妹以及堂或表兄弟姊妹他們資產淨值中也都有很大比例是波克夏的持股。
查理跟我對於這種把雞蛋放在同一個籃子的情況感到放心，因為波克夏本身擁有各式各樣真正優異的企業。的確，我們深信波克夏擁有的股權無論具控制權與否，已經是近乎唯一在質與多樣性上兼具的公司。
Charlie and I cannot promise you results. But we can guarantee that your financial fortunes will move in lockstep with ours for whatever period of time you elect to be our partner. We have no interest in large salaries or options or other means of gaining an “edge” over you. We want to make money only when our partners do and in exactly the same proportion. Moreover, when I do something dumb, I want you to be able to derive some solace from the fact that my financial suffering is proportional to yours.
查理跟我無法承諾你結果將會是如何。但是我們可以保證不論你是在哪個時期決定成為我們的合夥人，你的財富將與我們的財富一起成長。我們對於巨額薪酬、選擇權或是其他賺取超過你的好處沒興趣。我們只跟我們的合夥人賺同比例的錢。
此外，當我做了某項蠢事，我願你能從我也將蒙受同比例的損失這件事上得到一些慰藉。
3. Our long-term economic goal (subject to some qualifications mentioned later) is to maximize Berkshire’s average annual rate of gain in intrinsic business value on a per-share basis. We do not measure the economic significance or performance of Berkshire by its size; we measure by per-share progress. We are certain that the rate of per-share progress will diminish in the future—a greatly enlarged capital base will see to that. But we will be disappointed if our rate does not exceed that of the average large American corporation.
我們長期的經濟目標(容我在稍後再對此作描述)是以每股內在事業價值為基礎追求波克夏最大的年化報酬率.。我們不用波克夏的公司規模來衡量其經濟重要性或績效；我們透過每股進程來決定。我們可以確定在未來巨幅擴張資本的基礎下將見到每股表現每況愈下。但若是我們的成長率沒有超越美國大型企業的平均水準我們將感到失望。
4. Our preference would be to reach our goal by directly owning a diversified group of businesses that generate cash and consistently earn above-average returns on capital. Our second choice is to own parts of similar businesses, attained primarily through purchases of marketable common stocks by our insurance subsidiaries. The price and availability of businesses and the need for insurance capital determine any given year’s capital allocation.
我們偏好透過直接擁有多種可產生現金且資本報酬恆常高於一般水準的事業群來達到我們的目標。我們次佳的選項則是透過我們旗下保險子公司在公開市場買進普通股進而擁有上述特質企業的部份股權。價格、可行性以及對保險資本的需求狀況決定我們在特定年期中的資產配置方式。
In recent years we have made a number of acquisitions. Though there will be dry years, we expect to make many more in the decades to come, and our hope is that they will be large. If these purchases approach the quality of those we have made in the past, Berkshire will be well served.
近幾年我們已經完成幾項併購。即便必定出現荒年，我們依舊期待後續數十年完成更多更大項目的併購案。若是這些收購接近我們過去所達到的品質，波克夏將得到更好的成果。
The challenge for us is to generate ideas as rapidly as we generate cash. In this respect, a depressed stock market is likely to present us with significant advantages. For one thing, it tends to reduce the prices at which entire companies become available for purchase. Second, a depressed market makes it easier for our insurance companies to buy small pieces of wonderful businesses—including additional pieces of businesses we already own—at attractive prices. And third, some of those same wonderful businesses, such as Coca-Cola, are consistent buyers of their own shares, which means that they, and we, gain from the cheaper prices at which they can buy.
對我們最大的挑戰在於我們孕育新構想的速度必須跟我們產生現金的速度一樣快。基於這個因素，一個萎靡不振的股市比較可能讓我們發揮顯著的優勢。首先這樣可以降低所有企業的價格使其更可被收購。其次一個低迷的市場讓我們的保險公司得以用吸引人的價格買下卓越公司的部份股權(包括我們已經持有的公司也可增加其持股)。第三點，有些跟可口可樂同樣優異的公司，本身就是自家股份的長期買家，這意味他們跟我們都可以從買進較便宜的股票這件事上得到益處。
Overall, Berkshire and its long-term shareholders benefit from a sinking stock market much as a regular purchaser of food benefits from declining food prices. So when the market plummets—as it will from time to time—neither panic nor mourn. It’s good news for Berkshire.
整體說來，波克夏及其長期持有人都可以從下跌的股市中得到好處，正如同一般食物採購人可以從食物價格下跌中得到利益一般。所以當股市總是一次又一次發生崩跌時，無需恐慌或是哭喪著臉，要知道這對波克夏來說可是天大的好消息。
5. Because of our two-pronged approach to business ownership and because of the limitations of conventional accounting, consolidated reported earnings may reveal relatively little about our true economic performance. Charlie and I, both as owners and managers, virtually ignore such consolidated numbers. However, we will also report to you the earnings of each major business we control, numbers we consider of great importance. These figures, along with other information we will supply about the individual businesses, should generally aid you in making judgments about them.
由於我們對於事業所有權採兩手策略的態度並受限會計的先天限制，合併報表所載的盈餘數字可能僅揭露我們實際績效的一小部分而已。查裡跟我既身為公司的擁有人也是經理人，我們實際上會忽略這類合併數字。然而我們也會向你報告每個我們實質控制事業的盈餘，這才是我們認為最具重要性的數字。這些數字會在我們提供個別事業的資訊中一併出現，相信對於你在判斷他們的表現上會有幫助。
To state things simply, we try to give you in the annual report the numbers and other information that really matter. Charlie and I pay a great deal of attention to how well our businesses are doing, and we also work to understand the environment in which each business is operating. For example, is one of our businesses enjoying an industry tailwind or is it facing a headwind? Charlie and I need to know exactly which situation prevails and to adjust our expectations accordingly. We will also pass along our conclusions to you.
為了讓事情簡單化，我們試著在年報中呈現給你真正值得關切的數字跟資訊。查理跟我付出大半心力在關注我們的事業表現如何以及各事業所處產業環境的運作情形。舉例來說，我們的事業體究竟是在搭產業循環的順風車或是被該產業大環境不佳拖下水？查理跟我需要確切知道目前的情況並藉此調整我們的預期。我們也會把我們的結論傳達給你知悉。
Over time, the large majority of our businesses have exceeded our expectations. But sometimes we have disappointments, and we will try to be as candid in informing you about those as we are in describing the happier experiences. When we use unconventional measures to chart our progress—for instance, you will be reading in our annual reports about insurance “float”—we will try to explain these concepts and why we regard them as important. In other words, we believe in telling you how we think so that you can evaluate not only Berkshire’s businesses but also assess our approach to management and capital allocation.
長久以來，我們大部分的事業體都有超出我們預期的好表現。但有時也有令我們失望的情況發生，我們將盡可能坦率地向你告知這類信息一如我們過去在描述較愉快的經驗那般。當我們用非傳統的方法去評估我們的進程(例如你在我們的年報中所讀到的保險「浮存金」)，我們將試著解釋這些概念以及為何我們重視他們的原因。換句話說，我們深信在告知你我們的想法後，你不但能評估波克夏旗下的事業體，也能將其運用在管理及資產配置上。
6. Accounting consequences do not influence our operating or capital-allocation decisions. When acquisition costs are similar, we much prefer to purchase $2 of earnings that is not reportable by us under standard accounting principles than to purchase $1 of earnings that is reportable. This is precisely the choice that often faces us since entire businesses (whose earnings will be fully reportable) frequently sell for double the pro-rata price of small portions (whose earnings will be largely unreportable). In aggregate and over time, we expect the unreported earnings to be fully reflected in our intrinsic business value through capital gains.
會計推論並不影響我們的營運方針或資產配置決策。當併購成本相近，我們傾向購買在標準會計準則認定報告檯面下具有 2美元盈餘的標的，而非檯面上僅有 1美元盈餘者。這正是我們經常在收購一完整事業體(其盈餘為檯面上的算法)的一小部分(其盈餘大部分是在檯面下的)時會做出支付相當於一般估算兩倍價格決定的原因。總之在經年累月之後，我們期望這些檯面下盈餘最終將透過資本利得反映在我們事業的內在價值。
We have found over time that the undistributed earnings of our investees, in aggregate, have been fully as beneficial to Berkshire as if they had been distributed to us (and therefore had been included in the earnings we officially report). This pleasant result has occurred because most of our investees are engaged in truly outstanding businesses that can often employ incremental capital to great advantage, either by putting it to work in their businesses or by repurchasing their shares. Obviously, every capital decision that our investees have made has not benefitted us as shareholders, but overall we have garnered far more than a dollar of value for each dollar they have retained. We consequently regard look-through earnings as realistically portraying our yearly gain from operations.
我們發現經過一段時日後我們投資部位的未分配盈餘對波克夏的益處與這些盈餘直接分派給波克夏相當(也因此都會被涵蓋在我們官方報告的盈餘中)。這令人滿意的結果之所以會發生，乃歸功於大部分我們的投資標的都是表現優異的企業，因為這些企業經常得以將產出的資本再用以創造極大的利益，例如用來再投資原來的事業或是買回庫藏股。很顯然地，我們所投資事業的每個資本運用決策，對我們而言並不像對其股票投資人一樣有利，但整體說來，他們每保留一美元盈餘，我們將從中得到遠超過一美元的好處。我們因此將實質盈餘視為我們營運年度收益的最佳寫照。
7. We use debt sparingly and, when we do borrow, we attempt to structure our loans on a long-term fixed-rate basis. We will reject interesting opportunities rather than over-leverage our balance sheet. This conservatism has penalized our results but it is the only behavior that leaves us comfortable, considering our fiduciary obligations to policyholders, lenders and the many equity holders who have committed unusually large portions of their net worth to our care. (As one of the Indianapolis “500” winners said: “To finish first, you must first finish.”)
我們很謹慎地利用融資，並且當我們真的得借貸時，我們總試圖以長期固定利率的型態組織我們的負債。與可能對我們資產負債表造成高度槓桿的投資機會相比，我們更可能會拒絕的是那種僅僅看似吸引人的投資機會。這樣的保守原則對我們並非有利，但顧慮到我們對於被保險人、放款人以及許多將自己大半畢生心血交付給我們的股票持有人有道義及法律上的責任，這樣的作法卻能使我們感到安心。(誠如一位Indianapolis “500”獲勝的玩家所言：想要完成比賽獲得第一名，首先得先完成比賽)
The financial calculus that Charlie and I employ would never permit our trading a good night’s sleep for a shot at a few extra percentage points of return. I’ve never believed in risking what my family and friends have and need in order to pursue what they don’t have and don’t need.
Besides, Berkshire has access to two low-cost, non-perilous sources of leverage that allow us to safely own far more assets than our equity capital alone would permit: deferred taxes and “float,” the funds of others that our insurance business holds because it receives premiums before needing to pay out losses. Both of these funding sources have grown rapidly and now total about $68 billion.
查理跟我所運用的財務計算，絕對不會犧牲我們一夜好眠只為了換取一丁點額外的報償。我相信不須要為了追求我的親友們沒有或不需要的東西，而讓他們涉足不必要的風險。
此外，波克夏已擁有兩種低成本且無風險的舉債來源：遞延所得稅及「浮存金」(我們擁有的保險事業所持有的另一種資金，主要是從我們收取保費後到需要賠付這段期間所衍生)，這允許我們可以更安全擁有遠超過單靠我們資產淨值所能持有限制的總資產。這兩種資金來源快速成長至今已達到總共 680 億美金的規模
Better yet, this funding to date has often been cost-free. Deferred tax liabilities bear no interest. And as long as we can break even in our insurance underwriting the cost of the float developed from that operation is zero. Neither item, of course, is equity; these are real liabilities. But they are liabilities without covenants or due dates attached to them. In effect, they give us the benefit of debt—an ability to have more assets working for us—but saddle us with none of its drawbacks.
Of course, there is no guarantee that we can obtain our float in the future at no cost. But we feel our chances of attaining that goal are as good as those of anyone in the insurance business. Not only have we reached the goal in the past (despite a number of important mistakes by your Chairman), our 1996 acquisition of GEICO, materially improved our prospects for getting there in the future.
更棒的是，這些資金到目前為止還經常是零成本的。遞延所得稅負債項目不需要利息，而且只要我們能打平再保的成本，營運產生的浮存金的成本一樣是零。當然啦，這兩者都是真的負債而非資產淨值，但他們是沒有附加條款或是到期日的負債。實際上，這兩者給我們債務的好處(有能力擁有更多資產來為我們工作)卻沒讓我們承受一般債務所具缺點的重擔。
當然，並沒有人可以保證未來我們還是可以獲取零成本的浮存金。但我們感覺我們跟其他保險同業有相同機會達到這個目標。不僅我們在過去達到這目標(排除你們的董事長所犯下的一些重大過失)，我們在 1996 年併購GEICO 後，大大增進我們取得零成本浮存金的可能性。
8. A managerial “wish list” will not be filled at shareholder expense. We will not diversify by purchasing entire businesses at control prices that ignore long-term economic consequences to our shareholders. We will only do with your money what we would do with our own, weighing fully the values you can obtain by diversifying your own portfolios through direct purchases in the stock market.
管理階層的「希望清單」將不會讓股東埋單。我們不會只為了多角化經營而用控制價格去購買整個企業，卻忽視股東的長期經濟利益。我們只會用你的錢去做我們用自己的錢會去做的事，就像你會權衡自己能透過多樣化自己的投資組合可獲取多少價值後才經由股市購買股票一般。
Charlie and I are interested only in acquisitions that we believe will raise the per-share intrinsic value of Berkshire’s stock. The size of our paychecks or our offices will never be related to the size of Berkshire’s balance sheet.
查理跟我只有在確信我們可以提高波克夏股票的每股內在價值之後才對該併購案感興趣。我們的酬勞多寡或是辦公室大小都跟波克夏資產負債表的規模無關。
9. We feel noble intentions should be checked periodically against results. We test the wisdom of retaining earnings by assessing whether retention, over time, delivers shareholders at least $1 of market value for each $1 retained. To date, this test has been met. We will continue to apply it on a five-year rolling basis. As our net worth grows, it is more difficult to use retained earnings wisely.
我們覺得崇高的目標應該經常以成果來檢驗。我們透過評估每保留一美金盈餘經過一段時間後，股東們是否可從市值得到超過一美元效益，來檢測我們對保留盈餘的看法是否正確。至今為止，這樣的檢驗始終與我們的看法一致。我們將持續用往前回溯五年的基礎來運用這方式。隨著我們的資產淨值成長，要明智地運用保留盈餘將漸行困難。
We continue to pass the test, but the challenges of doing so have grown more difficult. If we reach the point that we can’t create extra value by retaining earnings, we will pay them out and let our shareholders deploy the funds.
我們持續通過測試，但挑戰卻日益艱鉅。假如我們達到無法從保留盈餘創造額外價值的轉捩點，我們將會把他們歸還給股東好讓他們可以自由運用這些資金。
10. We will issue common stock only when we receive as much in business value as we give. This rule applies to all forms of issuance—not only mergers or public stock offerings, but stock-for-debt swaps, stock options, and convertible securities as well. We will not sell small portions of your company—and that is what the issuance of shares amounts to—on a basis inconsistent with the value of the entire enterprise.
我們只有在當我們能付出跟獲取等量事業價值時才發行普通股。這規則適用於所有發行型態(不只是併購或公開發行，還包括股債轉換、股票選擇權以及可轉換有價證券)。在與整個企業價值不一致的前提下，我們將不會出售你的公司的一小部分(亦即總發行股數的對應數量)
When we sold the Class B shares in 1996, we stated that Berkshire stock was not undervalued—and some people found that shocking. That reaction was not well-founded. Shock should have registered instead had we issued shares when our stock was undervalued. Managements that say or imply during a public offering that their stock is undervalued are usually being economical with the truth or uneconomical with their existing shareholders’ money: Owners unfairly lose if their managers deliberately sell assets for 80¢ that in fact are worth $1. We didn’t commit that kind of crime in our offering of Class B shares and we never will. (We did not, however, say at the time of the sale that our stock was overvalued, though many media have reported that we did.)
當我們於 1996 年售出 B 股時，部分投資人對我們指稱波克夏股票的價值並未被低估感到震驚。這樣的反應實在是毫無根據。他們應該感到震驚的反而是我們當初登記發行的股票被低估這件事才對。當公司的高層在公開發行期間明說或暗指他們的股票價值被低估時，通常時依據的是公司當時實際經濟情況，而非依照原股東的持有成本而言：因為假如他們的經理人刻意用80美分的價格出售實際價值1美元的資產，將對股東造成不公平的損失之前我們在發行 B 股時不曾犯過這樣的罪行，往後也絕對不會。(然而，我們在當時並未宣稱我們的股價被高估，許多媒體卻都報導我們確實有這麼做)。
11. You should be fully aware of one attitude Charlie and I share that hurts our financial performance: Regardless of price, we have no interest at all in selling any good businesses that Berkshire owns. We are also very reluctant to sell sub-par businesses as long as we expect them to generate at least some cash and as long as we feel good about their managers and labor relations. We hope not to repeat the capital-allocation mistakes that led us into such sub-par businesses. And we react with great caution to suggestions that our poor businesses can be restored to satisfactory profitability by major capital expenditures. (The projections will be dazzling and the advocates sincere, but, in the end, major additional investment in a terrible industry usually is about as rewarding as struggling in quicksand.) Nevertheless, gin rummy managerial behavior (discard your least promising business at each turn) is not our style. We would rather have our overall results penalized a bit than engage in that kind of behavior.
你必須確實瞭解到查理跟我所分享的一種並不利於我們的財務表現態度：不管股價為何，我們毫無興趣出售波克夏旗下所擁有的優秀企業。只要我們預期他們至少會產出些許現金，並且只要我們對其勞資關係感到滿意，我們也非常不情願出售表現低於平均水準的事業體。我們只希望入主次級事業體這種資產配置的錯誤不再重複發生。我們將對那些聲稱只要對我們旗下表現不佳的事業體大幅提高資本支出即可讓公司回復到令人滿意收益的建議嚴正警告(這些推論看似前途似錦而且倡導人往往態度誠懇，但到了最後，對一個糟糕透頂的產業大量額外的投資通常得到的只是像陷入流沙般那樣苦苦掙扎)。儘管如此，唯利是圖的管理行為(每次都拋棄你認為最不具前景的事業體)並非我們的風格。我們寧願為保有全部成果而受點責罰，也不願意幹出那種勾當。
We continue to avoid gin rummy behavior. True, we closed our textile business in the mid-1980’s after 20 years of struggling with it, but only because we felt it was doomed to run never-ending operating losses. We have not, however, given thought to selling operations that would command very fancy prices nor have we dumped our laggards, though we focus hard on curing the problems that cause them to lag.
我們持續避免出現唯利是圖的行為。的確，我們在苦撐 20 年後最終仍在 1980 年代中期關閉我們的紡織事業，但這只因我們認為它已經陷入無窮無盡的營運虧損深淵之故。不過我們既不會以高價出售某些業務也不會摒棄我們表現較差的部分，我們會聚焦在解決造成它們表現不佳的原因。
12. We will be candid in our reporting to you, emphasizing the pluses and minuses important in appraising business value. Our guideline is to tell you the business facts that we would want to know if our positions were reversed. We owe you no less. Moreover, as a company with a major communications business, it would be inexcusable for us to apply lesser standards of accuracy, balance and incisiveness when reporting on ourselves than we would expect our news people to apply when reporting on others. We also believe candor benefits us as managers: The CEO who misleads others in public may eventually mislead himself in private.
我們將直言不諱地向你報告，並在評估企業價值時強調對其造成增減的重要項目。我們的指導手冊主要是告訴你那些即便我們彼此的立場互換，我們也會想知道的各事業體的實際營運狀況。我們絕對不會虧欠你。此外，就像一家傳播公司在資料正確性上對我們大打折扣是非常不可原諒一般，我們會對自家公司有更平衡及深入的報告內容，如同我們要求自己的新聞從業人員報導別人一般。我們同樣相信真誠對管理階層的好處會跟我們一樣：公開誤導其他人的 CEO 最終也會自欺欺人。
At Berkshire you will find no “big bath” accounting maneuvers or restructurings nor any “smoothing” of quarterly or annual results. We will always tell you how many strokes we have taken on each hole and never play around with the scorecard. When the numbers are a very rough “guesstimate,” as they necessarily must be in insurance reserving, we will try to be both consistent and conservative in our approach.
在波克夏你找不到會計花招或重組的「大澡堂」行為，也不會發現任何對季報或年報結果做任何的美化。我們總會告訴你我們在每一洞擊出多少竿且絕不會在計分卡上玩任何花樣。當保險準備金需要被粗略概估時，我們將試著沿用我們那套前後一致且保守的方式來施行。
＊譯注：大澡堂(Big Bath)
正如有許多工廠趁著颱風天排放污水以避免被察覺受罰一樣，上市上櫃公司在操縱盈餘方面也有類似的作法。有些(其實不少)公司為了讓獲利好看，通常會利用公司獲利很差的那一年把未來(或以前)可能要逐年提列的各種減損費用趁此機會提前(或延後)作一次性的提列。反正死豬不怕燙，公司獲利已經很差了，多提列一些費用也就不那麼敏感，被罵也只這麼一次。這種作法被稱之為「大澡堂」(Big Bath)，目的在於把未來(或以前)每年要逐年提列的費用提前(或延後)集中一次提列，以後(或以前)每年就可免提列該筆費用，獲利數字就可好看些。2008年全球金融風暴引起的衰退正好提供這種機會給許多有此(不良？)意圖的公司。(引用自「巴菲特價值投資討論區」)
We will be communicating with you in several ways. Through the annual report, I try to give all shareholders as much value-defining information as can be conveyed in a document kept to reasonable length. We also try to convey a liberal quantity of condensed but important information in the quarterly reports we post on the internet, though I don’t write those (one recital a year is enough). Still another important occasion for communication is our Annual Meeting, at which Charlie and I are delighted to spend five hours or more answering questions about Berkshire. But there is one way we can’t communicate: on a one-on-one basis. That isn’t feasible given Berkshire’s many thousands of owners.
我們會用幾種方式跟你連繫。透過年度報告我試圖給所有股東在合理的文件篇幅中盡可能多的價值定義資訊。我們也會試著在發佈到網路上的季報中呈獻給你充足卻扼要的重要資訊，雖然這些並非出自我手(個人秀一年一次就夠了)。另一個重要的聯繫場合正是我們的年度聚會，在這裡查理跟我很樂意花五個小時甚至更多時間去回答各位有關波克夏的種種問題。但是有種交流的方式我們則無法提供：一對一的交談方式。這對於擁有成千上萬股東的波克夏來說實在窒礙難行。
In all of our communications, we try to make sure that no single shareholder gets an edge: We do not follow the usual practice of giving earnings “guidance” or other information of value to analysts or large shareholders. Our goal is to have all of our owners updated at the same time.
在我們所有的聯絡方式中，我們試著確保沒有任何一個股東擁有優勢：我們不會遵循給財務預測的常規或是將其他有價值的資訊透露給分析師或大股東。我們的目標是讓所有股東在同一時間得到第一手訊息。
13. Despite our policy of candor, we will discuss our activities in marketable securities only to the extent legally required. Good investment ideas are rare, valuable and subject to competitive appropriation just as good product or business acquisition ideas are. Therefore we normally will not talk about our investment ideas. This ban extends even to securities we have sold (because we may purchase them again) and to stocks we are incorrectly rumored to be buying. If we deny those reports but say “no comment” on other occasions, the no-comments become confirmation.
儘管我們有坦白這項行事方針，我們只會在法律要求的前提下，討論我們對於上市有價證券的買賣情形。絕妙的投資點子是很稀有而且珍貴的，且如同好產品或優秀企業併購案那般極易遭致競爭對手的覬覦。所以我們通常不討論我們的投資想法。這個禁令同樣適用於我們已經出售的股票(因為我們可能會再買回)以及謠傳說我們將買進的標的。如果我們否認所有報告內容但卻在其他場合表明「不予置評」，那麼這個不予評論就應該是確認了。
Though we continue to be unwilling to talk about specific stocks, we freely discuss our business and investment philosophy. I benefitted enormously from the intellectual generosity of Ben Graham, the greatest teacher in the history of finance, and I believe it appropriate to pass along what I learned from him, even if that creates new and able investment competitors for Berkshire just as Ben’s teachings did for him.
雖然我們仍然沒有意願對特定股票表達看法，我們卻可對我們的事業及投資哲學暢所欲言。我個人從睿智慷慨且堪稱金融史上最偉大的導師-班‧葛拉漢身上獲益良多，即使班的教誨也調教出其他波克夏新的投資對手，而我依舊深信從他學習到的雋永智慧亦將助我繼續前行。
TWO ADDED PRINCIPLES
兩項新增準則
14. To the extent possible, we would like each Berkshire shareholder to record a gain or loss in market value during his period of ownership that is proportional to the gain or loss in per-share intrinsic value recorded by the company during that holding period. For this to come about, the relationship between the intrinsic value and the market price of a Berkshire share would need to remain constant, and by our preferences at 1-to-1. As that implies, we would rather see Berkshire’s stock price at a fair level than a high level. Obviously, Charlie and I can’t control Berkshire’s price. But by our policies and communications, we can encourage informed, rational behavior by owners that, in turn, will tend to produce a stock price that is also rational. Our it’s-as-bad-to-be-overvalued-as-to-be-undervalued approach may disappoint some shareholders. We believe, however, that it affords Berkshire the best prospect of attracting long-term investors who seek to profit from the progress of the company rather than from the investment mistakes of their partners.
在盡可能的情況下，我們希望每位波克夏的股東在他們持有股票的期間，可以透過同一時期公司每股的內在價值增減幅度等比例的反應在市價的增減紀錄上。這麼一來，波克夏的內在價值就必須和其市值的比例呈現一個定值，而我們傾向讓兩者是一比一的關係。如前所述，我們寧願看到波克夏的股價維持在公平的水準而非較高水準。很顯然地，查理跟我不會控制波克夏的股價。但是透過我們各種的行事方針及溝通管道，我們可以輪流鼓勵消息靈通且行為理性的投資人間接讓波克夏的股價趨於合理。我們「高低估一樣糟糕」的作法可能會讓某些投資人感到失望。然而，我們相信這樣的方式才是最有可能使波克夏吸引那些願意陪伴公司成長，而非是只想藉由其他投資人犯的過錯尋求利益的長期投資人。
15. We regularly compare the gain in Berkshire’s per-share book value to the performance of the S&P 500. Over time, we hope to outpace this yardstick. Otherwise, why do our investors need us? The measurement, however, has certain shortcomings that are described in the next section. Moreover, it now is less meaningful on a year-to-year basis than was formerly the case. That is because our equity holdings, whose value tends to move with the S&P 500, are a far smaller portion of our net worth than they were in earlier years. Additionally, gains in the S&P stocks are counted in full in calculating that index, whereas gains in Berkshire’s equity holdings are counted at 65% because of the federal tax we incur. We, therefore, expect to outperform the S&P in lackluster years for the stock market and underperform when the market has a strong year.
我們經常拿波克夏每股帳面價值的增益與 S&P 500指數的表現相比較。長此以往，我們希望能超越這個指標。要不然，為什麼我們的投資人還需要我們呢？然而這樣的檢驗方式有個特定的缺點，我將在下個章節描述這個缺點。此外，目前這樣的年增率比較方式已經比過去來得沒意義多了。此乃肇因於我們目前淨值中持有的股票其價值僅有一小部份與 S&P 500 連動，這與早年的情況截然不同。除此之外，S&P 股票收益乃全由其指數計算而得，而波克夏持股由於聯邦稅制的關係只有 65% 能計入。所以我們期望在股市了無生氣的年度裡勝過 S&P，而在股市過熱表現的幾年表現不佳我們倒不介意。
INTRINSIC VALUE
內在價值
Now let’s focus on a term that I mentioned earlier and that you will encounter in future annual reports.
Intrinsic value is an all-important concept that offers the only logical approach to evaluating the relative attractiveness of investments and businesses. Intrinsic value can be defined simply: It is the discounted value of the cash that can be taken out of a business during its remaining life.
現在讓我們把焦點放在我先前提到且將來你在年報中會遇到的一個名詞。內在價值是個能提供唯一具邏輯估算各投資項目或事業體的相對吸引力的一個極重要概念。內在價值可以被簡單定義為：一個事業在其存續期間所有產出現金的折現值總合。
The calculation of intrinsic value, though, is not so simple. As our definition suggests, intrinsic value is an estimate rather than a precise figure, and it is additionally an estimate that must be changed if interest rates move or forecasts of future cash flows are revised. Two people looking at the same set of facts, moreover—and this would apply even to Charlie and me—will almost inevitably come up with at least slightly different intrinsic value figures. That is one reason we never give you our estimates of intrinsic value. What our annual reports do supply, though, are the facts that we ourselves use to calculate this value.
雖然內在價值的估算並不容易。如我們所提出的定義，內在價值乃是一個估計值而非一個確切的數字，而且隨著利率的變化或是對於未來現金流量的預估被修正，都需要對其重新估算。此外，就算兩個人看到一樣多的事實依據(這同樣適用在查理跟我的身上)，仍然不可避免出現些微差距的內在價值估算結果。這也是從未給你我們對於內在價值估算值的主要原因之一。雖然在我們年度報告中提供的諸多事實正是我們自己用以計算內在價值的基礎。
Meanwhile, we regularly report our per-share book value, an easily calculable number, though one of limited use. The limitations do not arise from our holdings of marketable securities, which are carried on our books at their current prices. Rather the inadequacies of book value have to do with the companies we control, whose values as stated on our books may be far different from their intrinsic values.
同時，我們定期報告我們每股的帳面價值，雖然這是個容易計算的數據，但實際能運用的情況卻有極其有限。這些限制並非從我們持有的那些上市有價證券中產生(其市值持續反映在我們帳上)。而是帳面價值不足以彰顯我們掌控的公司，其帳面上所載淨值可能完全迥異於內在價值。
The disparity can go in either direction. For example, in 1964 we could state with certitude that Berkshire’s per-share book value was $19.46. However, that figure considerably overstated the company’s intrinsic value, since all of the company’s resources were tied up in a sub-profitable textile business. Our textile assets had neither going-concern nor liquidation values equal to their carrying values. Today, however, Berkshire’s situation is reversed: Now, our book value far understates Berkshire’s intrinsic value, a point true because many of the businesses we control are worth much more than their carrying value.
情況也可能完全相反。舉例來說，在 1964 年我們確信波克夏每股帳面價值為 19.46 美元。然而這數字有些誇大了公司的內在價值，因為所有公司的資源幾乎與無利可圖的紡織事業牢牢綁在一起。我們的紡織事業相關資產所登載的帳面價值，既與其繼續營運的價值不符，也與其清算價值不相當。然而今日波克夏的情況剛好相反：目前我們的帳面價值遠低於波克夏的內在價值，主要原因在於我們所控管的很多事業體其內在價值比他們所登載的帳面價值高得多了。
Inadequate though they are in telling the story, we give you Berkshire’s book-value figures because they today serve as a rough, albeit significantly understated, tracking measure for Berkshire’s intrinsic value. In other words, the percentage change in book value in any given year is likely to be reasonably close to that year’s change in intrinsic value.
即使上述的說明顯示帳面價值有不足之處，我們依舊給你波克夏的帳面價值等數字，因為如今這些數字提供一個儘管有些粗略、不充分但卻不失為追蹤波克夏內在價值的一個方式。換句話說，任何年度帳面價值變化的百分比很可能適度地接近其內在價值的年度波動程度。
You can gain some insight into the differences between book value and intrinsic value by looking at one form of investment, a college education. Think of the education’s cost as its “book value.” If this cost is to be accurate, it should include the earnings that were foregone by the student because he chose college rather than a job.
透過觀察大學教育這一種投資可以幫助你對於帳面價值跟內在價值之間的差異有更深刻的瞭解。我們先將教育成本視為他的「帳面價值」。假如這成本要是個很精確的數字，那麼應該將該名學生選擇求學而放棄工作所可能獲取的收入列入考量。
For this exercise, we will ignore the important non-economic benefits of an education and focus strictly on its economic value. First, we must estimate the earnings that the graduate will receive over his lifetime and subtract from that figure an estimate of what he would have earned had he lacked his education. That gives us an excess earnings figure, which must then be discounted, at an appropriate interest rate, back to graduation day. The dollar result equals the intrinsic economic value of the education.
在這個練習中，我們將忽略教育在非經濟性的重要效益並且只聚焦在其經濟價值上。首先，我們必須推估該名大學畢業生往後人生可賺取的收入，並扣除他若未受該項教育其工作所得的估計值。這給我們一個額外的獲利數字，接著將該數字以一個合適的利率折現，並回推到其畢業典禮當天。求得的結果相當於該教育的內在經濟價值。
Some graduates will find that the book value of their education exceeds its intrinsic value, which means that whoever paid for the education didn’t get his money’s worth. In other cases, the intrinsic value of an education will far exceed its book value, a result that proves capital was wisely deployed. In all cases, what is clear is that book value is meaningless as an indicator of intrinsic value.
有些大學畢業生將發現他們所受教育的帳面價值超過其內在價值，這表示無論是誰受該教育都是花冤枉錢。在其他情況，一項教育投資的內在價值將遠超過其帳面價值，而這結果證明資本被明智地分配。很顯然在所有情形下，帳面價值都是內在價值一個毫無意義的指標。
THE MANAGING OF BERKSHIRE
波克夏的管理
I think it’s appropriate that I conclude with a discussion of Berkshire’s management, today and in the future. As our first owner-related principle tells you, Charlie and I are the managing partners of Berkshire. But we subcontract all of the heavy lifting in this business to the managers of our subsidiaries. In fact, we delegate almost to the point of abdication: Though Berkshire has about 246,000 employees, only 19 of these are at headquarters.
我認為透過討論波克夏今後的管理來作此篇總結應該是挺恰當的。如同我們股東相關守則第一條所述，查理跟我是波克夏的管理搭檔。但我們把管理事業群比較吃重的工作都交由子公司的經理人代勞。事實上，我們幾乎委派所有工作給其他人並退居幕後：雖然波克夏擁有 246,000 個員工，其中卻只有 19 位在總部服務。
Charlie and I mainly attend to capital allocation and the care and feeding of our key managers. Most of these managers are happiest when they are left alone to run their businesses, and that is customarily just how we leave them. That puts them in charge of all operating decisions and of dispatching the excess cash they generate to headquarters. By sending it to us, they don’t get diverted by the various enticements that would come their way were they responsible for deploying the cash their businesses throw off. Furthermore, Charlie and I are exposed to a much wider range of possibilities for investing these funds than any of our managers could find in his or her own industry.
查理跟我主要參與資產配置以及我們重要經理人的培植。這些經理人在他們獨挑大樑時最感到愉快，而這正是我們對待他們的方式。這樣的安排讓他們得以全權負責營運決策並且得以上繳多餘的資金給總部。而將多餘資金交付給我們可以讓他們不會為了要配置資金到他們個別事業上而遭遇各種用度金錢伴隨的誘惑而分神。甚且，查理跟我在投資運用這些資金上本來就比我們謹守自己領域的經理人浸淫在更大範圍的機會之中。
Most of our managers are independently wealthy, and it’s therefore up to us to create a climate that encourages them to choose working with Berkshire over golfing or fishing. This leaves us needing to treat them fairly and in the manner that we would wish to be treated if our positions were reversed.
我們大部分的經理人本身都很富有，所以我們有責任創造一個可以鼓勵他們為波克夏工作的良好氛圍而不是花時間在打高爾夫球或釣魚上。這使我們必須公平地且設身處地以我們自己也願遵守的規範來對待他們。
As for the allocation of capital, that’s an activity both Charlie and I enjoy and in which we have acquired some useful experience. In a general sense, grey hair doesn’t hurt on this playing field: You don’t need good hand-eye coordination or well-toned muscles to push money around (thank heavens). As long as our minds continue to function effectively, Charlie and I can keep on doing our jobs pretty much as we have in the past.
提到資產配置，這可是一個查理跟我都很樂在其中且獲得不少寶貴經驗的活動。一般認知上，即便頭髮花白，在這個領域也不會受到任何影響：你不需要好的手眼協調能力或是健碩的肌肉就可以靈活調度資金(謝天謝地)。只要我們的心智精明依舊，查理跟我就能像從前一樣做好我們分內的工作。
On my death, Berkshire’s ownership picture will change but not in a disruptive way: None of my stock will have to be sold to take care of the cash bequests I have made or for taxes. Other assets of mine will take care of these requirements. All Berkshire shares will be left to foundations that will likely receive the stock in roughly equal installments over a dozen or so years.
一旦我撒手人寰，波克夏的股權結構將會改變但不致分崩離析：我所有的持股將不會為了現金遺贈或繳交稅金而出售。個人其餘部分的資產將會用來應付這類需求。所有波克夏的股票將分成十幾年漸次交付給各基金會託管。
At my death, the Buffett family will not be involved in managing the business but, as very substantial shareholders, will help in picking and overseeing the managers who do. Just who those managers will be, of course, depends on the date of my death. But I can anticipate what the management structure will be: Essentially my job will be split into two parts. One executive will become CEO and responsible for operations. The responsibility for investments will be given to one or more executives. If the acquisition of new businesses is in prospect, these executives will cooperate in making the decisions needed, subject, of course, to board approval. We will continue to have an extraordinarily shareholder-minded board, one whose interests are solidly aligned with yours.
在我死後，巴菲特家族將不會介入事業的管理，而只會當個堅實的股東協助遴選並監督經理人。當然，這些經理人何時上任得視我何時過世來決定，但是我可以事先決定管理架構：基本上我的工作將會分成兩部分。一個高層主管將會成為 CEO負責所有營運。投資相關的重擔則會落在一個或多個高階主管的身上。假如有一個新的合併案已經開始進行磋商，這些高階主管將會協同做出決策，當然啦，最後還是必須提交董事會同意才行。我們將會繼續保有一個關注股東權益的卓越董事會，其相關利益絕對會與你一致。
Were we to need the management structure I have just described on an immediate basis, our directors know my recommendations for both posts. All candidates currently work for or are available to Berkshire and are people in whom I have total confidence.
一旦我們急切需要如我前述的管理架構，我們的董事們知道我對這兩項職務的建議人選。所有候選人目前不是正為波克夏工作就是隨時都可以走馬上任，他們都是我可以完全信任的人選。
I will continue to keep the directors posted on the succession issue. Since Berkshire stock will make up virtually my entire estate and will account for a similar portion of the assets of various foundations for a considerable period after my death, you can be sure that the directors and I have thought through the succession question carefully and that we are well prepared. You can be equally sure that the principles we have employed to date in running Berkshire will continue to guide the managers who succeed me and that our unusually strong and well-defined culture will remain intact.
在繼任人選這個議題上，我將繼續保有董事資格。在我死後相當長的一段期間，我全部的遺產都會由波克夏股票組成，且這些股票將化為各基金會等價的資產，所以你可以確信董事們跟我對於繼任人選的問題必有通盤的考量並早已為此做好萬全準備。你同樣可以確定的是我們經營波克夏至今所運用的各項準則亦將持續帶領那些繼承我遺志的經理人，而我們非凡堅韌且定義明確的企業文化將原封不動地持續下去。
Lest we end on a morbid note, I also want to assure you that I have never felt better. I love running Berkshire, and if enjoying life promotes longevity, Methuselah’s record is in jeopardy.
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman
唯恐我們以哀戚作結，我要你知道我過去從未感到像現在這樣活力充沛，所以你大可放一百個心。我愛極了參與波克夏的運作，此外若享受生命有助於延年益壽，麥修撒拉(譯注：聖經記載非常高壽的人)的紀錄就岌岌可危了。
董事長 華倫‧巴菲特
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